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Wittgenstein, Lions, and Other Animals
William M. Richards
In Wittgenstein's later writings we are asked to imagine all sorts of animals doing
strange things: dogs simulating pain, parrots understanding formulas, crocodiles
thinking, squirrels justifying their behavior, etc. In addition to animals he describes
stoves in pain, various kinds of thinking automata, talking chairs, conscious stones,
and a machine with a toothache. This is strange fare for a logician-remorseful
dogs , stupid amoebas, and dentists with refrigerator clientelle.
The philosophical point made with this strange menagerie, however, at first
sight seems clear. Certain mental concepts such as hypocrisy, sincerity, compassion,
and hopefulness can be predicated only of human beings. It makes no sense to
speak of a hypocritical dog or a thoughtful amoeba because it is part of the linguistic topography of such concepts to be predicated only of language speakers.1
It seems that we would be warranted in concluding that since animals do not express themselves in relevant linguistic ways we cannot talk about them in all the
ways we talk about human beings. But if an animal could talk the matter would be
different. This seems to be a reasonable conclusion? that is, until we read the
remarkable statement near the end of the Philosophical Investigations:
If a lion could talk, we could not understand him. 3
It seemed plausible, initially, to regard talking as a sufficient condition for predicating certain mental concepts of animals. But here we are told that even if an
animal could talk we could not understand him. (It is assumed in this paper that
a lion's linguistic capabilities are representative of most animals'.) The lion statement is unique among all the statements Wittgenstein makes about animals. The
other statements in general have an 'only because' quality about them. That is, it
is implied that predication of certain terms to animals is awkward only because
they do not talk. The lion statement, on the other hand, seems to have an 'even if'
quality. That is, there are some things we can not say of animals even if they could
talk, because we could not understand them. Needless to say, the 'only because'
and the 'even if' statements clash. The condition for predication of mental concepts to animals implied in the former is denied in the latter.
The rest of this paper will be devoted to analyzing Wittgenstein's statement about
lions and the background material in his later writings which shed light on his
intention. The goal of the paper is to show that the initially startling claim about
lions reveals a basis for a fundamental theory of action deeply rooted in Wittgenstein's later works.
There are a number of seemingly plausible objections that could be raised
against the lion statement. From one point of view, the lion statement seems
to violate common sense and ordinary usage insofar as it implies that we do not
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know what it would be like to understand talking animals. But, it could be objected, nothing is easier. Remember the "Francis the Talking Mule" movies where
Francis and Donald O'Connor left nothing to the imagination. Certainly Donald
O'Connor was surprised the first time he heard Francis talk, but as he became
familiar with the animal's behavior, the idea of a talking mule became less strange.
But Wittgenstein's claim is not that it would take us a long time before the initial
strangeness wore off and we could admit to understanding a talking lion, but the
very bold claim that we could not do so, with apparently no reservations whatever.
Notwithstanding the strangeness and implausibility of a talking lion or a talking
mule, the common man would not hesitate to admit the possibility of understanding
a lion if one were to talk.
Philosophers and scientists have often cited the possibility of understanding
talking animals. The 18th century philosopher-linguist J. O. LaMettrie, for example,
said that the only reason apes could not talk was because of a defect in their
speech organs. He continues:
I have very little doubt that if this animal were properly trained he might
at last be taught to pronounce, and consequently to know a language. Then
he would no longer be a wild man, nor a defective man, but he would be a
perfect man, a little gentleman. 4
Wittgenstein's lion statement would certainly draw the fire of a host of behavioral scientists studying human and animal linguistic behavior. The criticism
would likely take the following line. What warrant is there for placing an a priori
restriction on what animals can do and what our reaction to their performance
will be? Why, before all the facts are in, close the inquiry? Indeed if lions can
talk scientists will crack the code of their linguistic style. We can all imagine at
this point the scientist showing us a lion inside a huge Skinner box with apparatus
for receiving and transmitting auditory stimuli.
The first objection is philosophical or linguistic in nature and for that reason
perhaps avoidable, but the present objection comes marked with the authority
of contemporary scientific methodology. How could Wittgenstein justify his restraint on animal-human communication in the face of the successes being recorded with the communication systems of bees, monkeys, and porpoises? Did
Wittgenstein know some facts about animals which present day scientific researchers do not? It is doubtful. These criticisms are important in that their different
points of view help reveal important features of Wittgenstein's conceptual framework. Let us now explore some of the conceptual background from Wittgenstein's
later writings in order to provide a context in which to understand the lion statement and perhaps to respond to his critics. Two interrelated concepts will be
explored.

II.
Justification
When one asks "Why did you raise your arm?" or "Why are you going for a
walk?" he is asking someone to justify his action. Action theorists normally dis-
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tinguish the giving of reasons and causes as two distinct ways of justifying human
behavior. In discussing why someone chose a particular bolt of material Wittgenstein makes the distinction:
If you ask "Why?", do you ask for the cause or for the reason? If for the
cause, it is easy enough to think up a physiological or psychological
hypothesis which explains this choice under the given conditions. It is the
task of the experimental sciences to test such hypotheses. If on the other
hand you ask for a reason the answer is, "There need not have been a
reason for the choice. A reason is a step preceding the step of the choice.
But why should every step be preceded by another one?"s
The chain of reasons comes to an end. 6 "Johnny, why did you raise your arm?"
"Because I am thirsty and want permission to get a drink of water." "Why are
you thirsty? " At this point Johnny and most normal persons would probably reply
"Just because I am," or "I don't know." But some philosophers and scientists would
be tempted to continue the chain of justifications at this point by starting a causal
account where reasons left off. Thus, "I am thirsty because the water vapor has
evaporated from my tissue. " "Why? " "Because forces of cohesion among the
molecules of water vapor under conditions Cl , C2, C3, . . . , etc." An ingenious pair
of scientists could continue this questioning and answer-giving indefinitely providing hypotheses, laws, theories , facts, and guesses in the process. Reasons come
to an end but causes, and so too philosophical perplexity, need not.
Certainly, most of the time in everyday type affairs when we ask 'why' of someone's actions we want reasons for action, not scientific theories of the causes for
the physical behavior accompanying the action. On the other hand scientists in
their study of human behavior normally are concerned only with physical accounts
of behavior. When Johnny runs out of reasons and says "I don't know" whereas
the scientist continues in full force providing causes, it is not the case that the
scientist was more attentive to the mechanics of the events preceding Johnny's
thirst. No! The scientist has a method for talking about human behavior different
from that of giving reasons. Knowledge of causes does not fill a void which the
absence of reasons leaves. The inability to give reasons beyond a certain point is
not a deficiency in man. It is part of his definition. It is a form of life.
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e.
it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the
bottom of the language-game. 7
A great deal of debate regarding philosophical vs. scientific explanations could
be stalled if this distinction between reason giving and cause constructing were
properly understood. Scientists construct causal explanations for phenomena. Men
give reasons for their activities. But notice, doing science is itself a human activity
for which there mayor may not be reasons in particular cases. Ask scientists why
they do science, or better, why they accept certain theories as sufficient explanation for certain phenomena and no doubt, a number would reply, "Just because."
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Scientific explanations have no fundamental priority over explanations in terms
of reasons. Science itself is an activity having as ultimate justification a form of
life of the human species. This point is the clue to understanding Wittgenstein's
seemingly mysterious explorations into the foundations of mathematics and the
sciences. Why do mathematicians and scientists agree with one another?8 Many
philosophers have answered that the propositions of mathematics and certain of
those of the natural sciences are self-evident. The problem with this kind of
answer is that the meaning of the expression 'self-evidence' is far from selfevident. Wittgenstein avoids the circularity and arbitrariness involved in grounding
mathematics and science by denying they need a foundation. 9 Like any human
linguistic activity mathematics and the natural sciences rest upon a prior agreement in judgment-from which it follows that we do mathematics and science the
way we do . Giving mathematical and scientific explanations should be considered
therefore as one of our forms of life.
The above considerations of science and mathematics are leading to a confrontation with those philosophers who when reason-giving comes to an end
hurredly enlist the aid of science for causal explanations, lest they should fall
victim to scepticism, solipsism, or some other psychological abberation. The mistake is to think of scientific method as somehow on the same level as reasongiving so that where reasons cease, causes must begin. It would seem that many
traditional discussions of the problem of other minds make this mistake. To find
other minds a problem is to put the cart before the horse:
"Putting the cart before the horse" may be said of an explanation like
the following: we tend someone else because by analogy with our own
case we believe that he is experiencing pain too.-Instead of saying: Get
to know a new aspect from this special chapter of human behavior-from
this use of language. to
Wittgenstein's point is that we do not make an inference to the existence of
another mind on the basis of similarity of behavior, nor do we infer another man
has pain by reflecting on the closeness of his behavior with my own under similar
circumstances. Except in the treatment of extreme mental patients there is no
empirical evidence that either children or adults do this sort of thing,11 We do not
need a scientific method of argument by analogy to explain why we act toward
other persons the way we do. Explanation is out of place here. The fact is we
do it. This is one of those aspects of human experience where reasons cease and
causes are irrelevant.
My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the
opinion that he has a soul. 12
The effect of Wittgenstein's theory of action based upon his concept of form
of life is to direct our attention towards the experiences and justificatory attitudes one has in the course of living as a human being with other human beings
and away from the model of human behavior as a mechanism triggered by the
presence of a certain set of necessary and perhaps sufficient circumstances in our
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environment. The result of misapplying the two fundamental modes of human
explanation is a certain distortion of human experience as illustrated by the
pseudo-problem of other minds.
Wittgenstein's discussion of the so called "law of causality" shows how consistent he is in maintaining the autonomy of reason-giving from scientific explanation.
I saw this man years ago: now I have seen him again, I recognize him;
I remember his name. And why does there have to be a cause of this remembering in my nervous system? Why must something or other, what
ever it may be, be stored up there in any form? Why must a trace have
been left behind? Why should there not be a psychological regularity to
which no physiological regularity corresponds? If this upsets our concept
of causality then it is high time it was upset.13
This claim follows from Wittgenstein's account of justification. He is not claiming there are no causes for our mental experiences, nor is he claiming there are.
He is claiming that for the purpose of talking about our experiences insofar as we
can describe the experiences from our own case there need be none which is
equivalent to the claim that scientists may be unsuccessful in constructing a theory
adequate to account for all the relevant aspects of human experience. And there
is no justification for stipulating that science must be successful in every instance.
Form of Life
The concept 'form of Life' represents the core of Wittgenstein's theory of action.
We are all probably familiar with the following occurrences of this expression:
And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. 14
Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the
fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of
life. 15
What has to be accepted , the given, is-so one could say-forms of
life. 16
From these passages it is clear that 'form of life' is somehow more basic or prior
than 'language games.' The last quote shows that the term can be used in the
plural so there must be more than one form of life. But in what sense are forms
of life basic or prior to specific linguistic activities? Wittgenstein gives a strong
clue in On Certainty:
Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to
hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life ... But that means I want
to conceive it as something that is beyond being justified or unjustified;
as it were, as something animal.17
In the same work this position receives emphasis:
I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which
one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state.
Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no
apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocina tion. 18
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In another collection of fragments published posthumously, Zettel, this theme
is continued:
I really want to say that scruples in thinking began with (have their
roots in) instinct. Or again: a language-game does not have its origin in
consideration. 19
And the crucial passage:
It is a help here to remember that it is a primitive reaction to tend to
treat, the part that hurts when someone else is in pain; and not merely
when oneself is ... But what is the word "primitive" meant to say here?
Presumably that this sort of behavior is pre-linguistic: That a languagegame is based on it, that it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not
the result of thought. 2o
These latter quotes bear the theme that man does not decide to engage in linguistic activities. He simply does so as the result of pre-linguistic propensities or
animal instincts. Based upon his use of the expressions in question it is plausible
to take what Wittgenstein calls here instincts and primitive reactions as what he
referred to earlier as forms of life. Form of life, then, seems to have a dual structure. It is at once linguistic and biological, 'linguistic' in the sense that our language
activities embody a set of common tasks or kinds of activities, e.g. expressing
emotions, calling for help, answering questions, giving orders, etc.; 'biological' in
the sense that these kinds of activities seem to be common to the human species
qua species, i.e. not contigent upon sociological factors. Man engages in the kinds
of linguistic activities he does because of the conceptual constraints imposed by
his physico-linguistic makeup. Thus just as a monkey has an instinct and a competence to climb trees so a human being has an instinct and a competence to talk
in the many ways he does.
It might be objected at this point that 'forms of life' is ambiguous. Are they, ala
Vygotsky, 'forms of thought' as the result of internalizing forms of communal problems and procedures or are they ala Chomsky, universal and preexisting forms of
'inner' mental activity which are used to generate forms of public speech? Thus is
Wittgenstein going from outer to inner or inner to outer? And then too, what's
the structure of these 'forms of life'? Is Wittgenstein suggesting the existence of
syntactic universals or semantic universals? Is Wittgenstein suggesting some kind
of isomorphism between physiological structure and linguistic structure? These are
good questions in their own right but applied to Wittgenstein they miss the boat.
Wittgenstein insists throughout his latter writings that the philosopher does not
explain anything; the philosopher only describes. Wittgenstein characteristically
proffers no theories-he advocates no philosophical theses. His procedure is to
take note of and describe the way we talk about ourselves and the world. He has
noted certain regularities or patterns of linguistic behavior-certain kinds of things
we all do. Thus, e.g., in giving explanations in terms of reasons for our actions
we often can appeal to no better reasons than, e.g., 'just because,' or 'I don't
know,' or 'I never thought about it,' or 'I like it' or 'for no reason whatsoever.'
There is no evidence in many cases that much of what we do involves decision
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procedures. We simply do certain kinds of things because we're disposed that
way. In the attempt to describe linguistic topography we have here come to an
impasse. We are here at the limits of our language. There is nothing else to
describe. For a descriptive philosopher like Wittgenstein, who regards philosophy
as clarification or description and not proposal, 'form of life' is the ultimate
appeal in terms of which he can clarify. 'Forms of life,' unspecific though it may
be, expresses the outer limits of philosophy as clarification.
The claim that language games are expressions of forms of life is, of course,
formally contingent. It is based ultimately on the way we talk about ourselves.
It could have been different for human beings. We can imagine a world different
from ours in which there is no regularity from culture to culture of the tasks
humans perform, or the kinds of justifications they give for their activities. And
we can imagine a world different from ours where humans are aware of an
indefinite sequence of causal steps conditioning all of their behavior. But these
possible situations do not obtain in our case. The philosopher can merely provide
a context in which are made explicit the ways we talk about ourselves as human
beings and the corresponding parameters of what we do accept as meaningful.
To make this primitive notion more specific, i.e. to fill in the structure of 'form
of life' is a task for the sciences-neurology, physiology, psychology, theoretical
linguistics all of which proffer explanations in terms of some formal method of
representation. The preference for a Vygotsky type, or Chomsky type, form of
representation is an intra-scientific consideration and criteria for such a preference
do not exclude but certainly go beyond accordance with how we talk about
ourselves.
It is in the above sense that forms of life are given; without the conceptual
constraints implicit in human syntactic and semantic competences there would be
no language-games as we know them.
The form of life of the human species is a prototype of what the species accomplishes in the way of language. 'Form of life' and 'language-game' are thus
interconnected, the latter being a natural extension of the former. 21
Language is variously rooted-it is rooted in the diverse forms or instincts
embedded in our organism.22 Men understand one another, agree in the rules
which govern their common linguistic activities insofar as they share a prior
agreement-agreement in form of life or primitive reactions.
If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement
not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. 23
In this vein Wittgenstein speaks of the "common behavior of mankind."24 the
ability of all persons to master linguistic techniques in spite of diverging backgrounds,25 actions of "normal human beings,"26 and of judging "in conformity with
mankind."27 These ways of speaking underline the point that for Wittgenstein the
competence to speak a language is grounded in the species, the organic structure
of man, and not in man's reflection upon his environment nor in a reaction to
external stimuli. In short, a man engages in the language games he does just
because he is a man. Wittgenstein's contribution to action theory is his insight
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that the point at which justification ends is coextensive with the limits of our
form of life. Thus I cannot give reasons beyond a certain point because that is
the kind of organism I am and not because I have not reflected sufficiently upon
the surroundings or introspected my psyche properly.
III

Havings developed some conceptual background let us relook at Wittgenstein's
claim about lions.
If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.
What would it be like to talk to a lion and understand him? Understanding
is not some kind of inner process that swims before the mind's eye as an
accompaniment to hearing. 28 Understanding is more like the grasp of the deep
structure or the point of an utterance which requires an appreciation for the
form of life of the speaker. This is to say that "understanding" is not so much a
state word as an achievement word. To understand an expression one must engage
in an activity that can be specified only in terms of the richness of the context
in which the expression to be understood occurs. The language game is the
primary thing to look for in interpreting the meaning of a word or expression.29
And a language game is embedded in some form of life. And here is the crucial
point behind Wittgenstein's statement. I have little or no appreciation for the
forms of life of lions. I do not know how a lion thinks , the kinds of reasons he
is apt to give for his behavior. In short, I have none of the conceptual backing
required for , penetrating the presumed surface grammar of lion talk. 1 might
hear a lion say something; I might talk to him; but this as yet does not constitute understanding. To understand someone requires more than agreement in
definitions; it requires agreement in judgments. And this prior agreement or
common life form is what humans and lions lack.
But someone could still object: "If a lion spoke to me in English could I not
assume he meant by his words the same as a normal person would mean by the
same words under similar circumstances? And by this procedure we could carry
on a limited intelligent conversation. For example, if a lion looked up from his
empty water bowl and said in a gruff voice , 'I am thirsty,' I could understand
his utterance as a request for water." I am not sure what to say to this objection.
The possibility of a lion speaking to me in English or any other language confuses
me. Of course I can imagine a talking lion, Francis the mule, and a gentleman
ape, but imagining is not to be mistaken for understanding. As Wittgenstein puts it:
That we can 'imagine' something does not mean that it makes sense
to say it. 3D
The imagined language game sounds funny. I cannot anticipate my reaction
under the supposed circumstances. And my doubt here is important.
In philosophy it is significant that such and such a sentence makes
no sense; but also that it sounds funny.31
My attitude towards lions is that towards something that grunts and groans,
but which does not possess competence for language. I can easily imagine a
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lion as hungry or tired. And on the one hand I can imagine words coming from
his mouth, but on the other hand that would seem funny. If I heard a lion
talking I think I would be inclined to check the immediate environment for
hidden microphones or some such stage devices. If I were assured the lion
was authentic and the sounds came from his larynx, then I would be tempted
to think that his brain had been tampered with by scientists and that he was
"talking" by remote control. If none of these suspicions was well founded then
I would probably infer the lion was really talking.
But notice I would make an inference that the lion was really talking, i.e. that
he originated the words- that he was the agent. In the case of a lion I should
have to interpret his utterances as authentic expressions. But this is a far cry
from what Wittgenstein means by understanding. Understanding in the full sense
is a primitive reaction; it is where interpretations come to an end; it is itself
a form of life. In short, were a lion to talk we might infer his utterance to be
authentic, but in no meaningful sense of "understand" would we understand him.
What is lacking in the case of a lion is a certain ease that characterizes understanding. We are not at ease in admitting we can understand lions even if they
could talk. There may be nothing lacking in a lion's grammar, nevertheless
understanding is not determined strictly on the basis of the grammatical moves
of the presumed language game. Even granted the lion's grammar to be flawless,
and granted we may be tempted to say we understand him, we probably still
would have reservations. Understanding language involves more than grammatical strategy. In the end we cannot hope to specify the necessary and sufficient set of conditions requisite to understanding for the , by now, obvious
reason that we do not, normally, choose to do what we call "understand" and as
a result we do not subject expressions to a set of conditions. We just understand.
There need be nothing 'before our minds' when we understand something.
From the above remarks we can see that the initial objection to the lion statement to the effect that it constitutes an a prioi closure of scientific inquiry is
irrelevant. When we unpack the lion statement we find a logical elucidation of
some of the conditions according to which we admit that we understand . Even
if within the context of some theory, behavioral scientists could make a case
for a workable Lionese grammar, that would not justify us in saying we thereby
understand the animal.
As with many philosophical matters however the philosophical point need not
be without a bearing on empirical procedures . Thus Wittgenstein's concep,t of
form of life as a logical condition for language-use can be taken as a suggestion
that some scientific investigations of human and animal language acquisition
and use are conceptually confused. Scientific models should be adapted to the
phenomena they are trying to explain. Wittgenstein has stressed certain dissimilarities between the concepts of language-use by animals and humans which
should be reflected in scientific theories. In his theory of action Wittgenstein
is indirectly suggesting that human language is much more complicated than
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some behaviorists have assumed and also that animal language is much less
human than has often been assumed.32
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